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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO CASES
ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
By ARNOLD M. CHUTKOW of the Denver Bar
During the past year, the Supreme Court decided four cases
dealing directly or indirectly with the Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments. Two of these decisions, American National Bank of Denver
v. First National Bank of Denver, et al.,' and Harsin Motor Co. v.
Colorado Savings & Trust Co., et al.,2 dealt directly with problems
peculiar to the field of negotiable instruments.
In the American National Bank case, the plaintiff brought the
action against the Hereford State Bank, the first endorsee on a
check and against the First National Bank of Denver, an inter-
mediate endorsee. The check in question was payable to two
payees, but was negotiated to the defendant, Hereford bearing the
endorsement of only one. Hereford endorsed to a bank in Chey-
enne, Wyoming which in turn endorsed to the defendant, the First
National Bank of Denver, which presented check to the drawee-
plaintiff. The drawer objected to the payment because of the
missing endorsement and the plaintiff reimbursed the drawer's
account and instituted the action to recover the amount paid on
the check.
The action was based upon two theories, one stemming from
the Negotriable Instruments Law and the other stemming from the
doctrine of payment under mutual mistake of fact, i.e. that all
endorsements necessary were not properly on the instrument. The
Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal as to the First National Bank,
but reversed with respect to a dismissal on the second theory as
to the Hereford State Bank.
Reasoning that since the instrument was not properly endorsed
by both payees, the Court concluded that the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law was not applicable since the instrument was not nego-
tiable because of the missing endorsement. Apparently basing its
decision on quaisi-contractual notions, the Court reversed the dis-
missal as to Hereford, stating:
"The present action must be based upon an obligation
on Hereford's part to reimburse plaintiff for monies in its
possession to which it is not legally entitled."
No explanation was offered for affirming the dismissal as to
the First National Bank of Denver. Perhaps it may be assumed
that the affirmance of this dismissal was based on the desire to
avoid circuity of actions. Nevertheless, the case does stand for the
proposition that the first endorsee in the chain of titles who
takes an instrument where the endorsement of one of a number
of payees is missing, will be held liable in an action by the drawee
to recover payments made on the instrument.
In the case of Harsin Motor Co. v. Colorado Savings & Trust
Co., et al., the drawer issued a check payable to "Barne's Used Cars"
in payment of a car which was purchased. The findings of the trial
I Colo. , 277 P. 2d 235.
2 Cold. 284 P. 2d 235.
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court were to the effect that one Rickerson, offered to sell Harsin
a 1951 Chevrolet automobile, advising Harsin that the title to the
car was in the name of "Barnes Used Cars"; that the certificate
of title was in the possession of one Zipprodt. Harsin, before com-
pleting the purchase, telephoned the manager of Zipprodt, a finance
company, who was a third party defendant, and verified that
Zipprodt held the certificate of title to the 1951 automobile. Harsin,
desiring to make payment to the owner of the car, executed his
check payable to Barnes Used Cars, though Rickerson had asked
Harsin to make him the payee, which Harsin declined to do. It
appeared at the time that Rickerson owed the finance company
the sum of $500.00 and that Zipprodt, the finance company, was
holding a certificate of title to the automobile. Zipprodt did not
have a chattel mortgage on the car. Rickerson then took the check
ot the finance company and endorsed it in the presence of the
finance company as follows:
Barnes Used Cars-Charles Barnes-James H. Rick-
erson.
It was later ascertained that the automobile had been stolen
and it was repossessed by the rightful owner, whereupon the plain-
till informed the bank that the endorsement on the check was a
forgery and demanded that the bank credit his account. The bank
did this but later withdrew the credit it had given.
The named payee was actually an existing person, doing busi-
ness in Ordway, Colorado. Rickerson had assumed the name, al-
though the payee had nothing to do with the transaction, appar-
ently for the purpose of avoiding a violation of the statute requir-
ing a person dealing with used cars to have a license.
The trial court dismissed the action against all defendants.
It should be noted that the action was basically a contest between
the drawer and the drawee of the check. The question was one of
whether or not a forgery had been committed when the payee's
name was endorsed by Rickerson. Resolution of the question of
whether or not a forgery had been committed depended on the
intent of the drawer in making the check payable to "Barnes Used
Cars".
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The Court drew a distinction between the situation where a
check is drawn payable directly to the imposter acting under an
assumed name and the situation where the check, as in the present
case, is drawn and delivered to the imposter, unpon the represen-
tation that the latter is the agent of the payee, even though the
payee is fictitious or non-existent. In the former case, it is gener-
ally held that the drawer's intent is to make the check payable
to the person physically present before him, regardless of the name
assumed or employed by the person. On the other hand, if the intent
was not to make the check payable to the person physically present
before the drawer, but to his principal, whether there was such a
principal or not, an endorsement by the importer, may constitute a
forgery. If it is a forgery, of course, the drawee may not charge the
account of the drawer.
The Court accordingly reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to vacate the order of dismissal, and to proceed with a trial
on the merits. It was the opinion of the Court, that inasmuch as a
forgery may have been committeed, the facts should be presented
before any determination of the issue was made.
In the case of Wysowatcky, Guardian v. Denver-Willys, Inc.
3
the problem was that of where an indorsee takes a negotiable in-
strument from a fiduciary who cashes the check in payment of a
personal debt or for his personal benefit. It was contended by the
plaintiff-in-error that if the endorser knows that the endorser is a
fiduciary, the former is put upon notice of the breach of trust of
the endorser and must make inquiries so as to determine the cor-
rect facts.
The Court, however, applied the language of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act 4 and held that inasmuch as there was no evidence
that the negotiation of the check amounted to a breach of a fiduci-
ary obligation, and more important, no evidence that the indorsee
had actual knowledge of the breach of the obligation, the indorsee
was not liable to the principal of the fiduciary.
In the case of Hubby v. Willis Agency, Inc,,' it was held that
a payee and holder of a Promisory Note may maintain an action
thereon, even though he is not the beneficial owner of the instru-
ment upon which suit is brought. Thus, even though the payee only
has naked legal title and is nominally the payee, the beneficial or
equitable ownership being vested in another, or if payee and holder
does not have the entire interest in the instrument, he may never-
theless maintain an action on it in his own name, regardless of any
notions of real party in interest.
The cases decided by the Court on negotiable instruments are
not many but it is believed that the first two, the American National
Bank case and the Harsin case are interesting and involve directly
problems peculiar to the field of negotiable instruments.-A. C.
Colo. - 281 P. 2d 165.
4C.S.A. 1953, Chapter 57, Article 1, Section 4.
__ C61o. , 283 P. 2d 1080.
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